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Abstract 
Most firms use secrecy to protect their knowledge from potential imitators. However, the theoretical 
foundations for secrecy have not been well explored. We extend knowledge protection literature and 
propose theoretical mechanisms explaining how information visibility influences the importance of 
secrecy as a knowledge protection instrument. Building on mechanisms from information economics and 
signaling theory, we postulate that secrecy is more important for protecting knowledge for firms that have 
legal requirements to reveal information to shareholders. Furthermore, we argue that this effect is 
contingent on the location in a technological cluster, on a firm’s investment in fixed assets and on a firm’s 
past innovation performance. We test our hypotheses using a representative sample of 683 firms in 
Germany between 2005 and 2013. Our results support the moderation effect of a technological cluster and 
a firm’s investment in fixed assets. Our results inform both academics and managers on how firms 
balance information disclosure requirements with the use of secrecy as a knowledge protection 
instrument. 
 
Keywords: Secrecy; Information disclosure; Knowledge visibility; Technological clusters; Innovation 
performance 
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1. Introduction 
The threat of imitation by competitors of a firm’s unique knowledge is central to theories on knowledge-
based competitive advantages of innovative firms (Spender and Grant, 1996). Many firms counter this 
threat by keeping their R&D activities secret. Then again, legal requirements and accounting standards 
require firms to disclose information regularly to shareholders, and this information is also potentially 
available to competitors. The goal of this study is to explore how these requirements change the 
importance of secrecy for protecting knowledge in innovation activities. Considerations for mandatory 
information disclosure are largely absent in existing literature, predicting that secrecy is most important 
for firms lacking resources and technological or legal opportunities to apply for patent protection (Bos, 
Broekhuizen and de Faria, 2015 provide a recent review). We draw on information economics and 
signaling theory and argue that the importance of secrecy is influenced by the visibility of a firm’s 
activities to potential imitators. The more visible a firm, the more vulnerable it is for imitation. 
Secrecy is a widely used and efficient knowledge protection mechanism in virtually all industries 
and firms of all types and sizes (Bos et al., 2015; Hall, Helmers, Rogers and Sena, 2014; Harabi, 1995; 
James, Leiblein and Lu, 2013). Firms actively restrict information flows both within and outside their 
boundaries with the objective of limiting unintended information spillovers (James et al., 2013). Research 
has emerged that stresses secrecy as an important factor in “make or buy” decisions (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006), its relation with other protection mechanisms such as lead-time or patenting (Arundel, 
2001; Cohen and Walsh, 2000) and its effect on strategic alliance decisions (Katila, Rosenberger and 
Eisenhardt, 2008). However, despite the wide use of secrecy as a knowledge protection instrument in 
managerial practice, we know little about the importance of secrecy for firms that are increasingly visible 
to potential imitators. 
The essence of secrecy is the creation or extension of an information asymmetry between a firm 
and potential imitators with regard to the firm’s knowledge stock. We argue that the importance of 
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secrecy as a knowledge protection instrument depends on how visible a firm is to its competitors. Since 
the quality of a firm’s knowledge is often difficult for external parties to directly observe, potential 
imitators rely on observable quality signals to select their imitation targets (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 
1999). The major sources of information for competitors are firms’ own financial reports, where firms 
disclose information based on legal regulations of a specific country (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003). We 
argue that firms that are legally required to share information with their shareholders will be more visible 
to potential imitators. Consequently, secrecy will become more important as a knowledge protection 
instrument because visible firms will find it more important to create an information asymmetry by using 
secrecy to protect their knowledge from imitation. Furthermore, we hypothesize that this effect of legal 
mandatory information disclosure requirements on the importance of secrecy is moderated by the location 
of a firm withina technological cluster, the level of investment in fixed assets and its past innovation 
performance. All these factors increase the firm’s visibility to potential partners and, when combined with 
mandatory information disclosure, lead to a stronger increase in the importance of secrecy. 
We test the hypotheses using a representative sample of 683 firms in Germany between 2005 and 
2013. We show that secrecy is more relevant for protecting knowledge for firms that have legal 
requirements to reveal information to shareholders. Moreover, we find support for the moderation effect 
of technological clusters and firms’ investment in fixed assets. Our findings have important implications 
for two primary streams of research. First, we add to the literature on knowledge protection by showing 
specific contingency factors for when secrecy is especially important. Existing literature on knowledge 
protection and appropriability has described the importance of secrecy as depending on knowledge 
characteristics, industry factors and cost considerations (James et al., 2013; Bos et al., 2015). We go 
beyond these findings, and provide a theoretical model that links the importance of secrecy to the 
visibility of the firm. Second, we contribute to a stream of research that has compared the effects of 
various knowledge protection instruments and their interactions but that treats them as exogenous 
(Hussinger, 2006; Jensen and Webster, 2009). Our findings show that this assumption is too strong and 
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that the importance of secrecy can be traced back to how visible the firm is. More comprehensive models 
will be able to eradicate a potential source of bias by taking these endogenous relationships into account 
when estimating performance effects. These academic implications have consequences for managerial 
decision-making. Our findings show that firms need to adjust their knowledge protection if they are more 
visible to potential imitators. Firms with mandatory requirements to disclose knowledge located in 
technological clusters and that make higher investments in fixed assets will need to prepare for potential 
imitators which may previously have overlooked the firm. Under such conditions, secrecy becomes more 
important for knowledge protection, and firms should reassess access to sensitive laboratories, databases 
or R&D personnel. 
The remainder of the analysis is structured as follows. The next section reviews core theoretical 
constructs and mechanisms associated with secrecy as a knowledge protection instrument. In the 
hypotheses development section, we elaborate on our predictions regarding the relationship between firm 
visibility and the importance of secrecy. The subsequent section describes the empirical study, followed 
by the results. We conclude by discussing the results, deriving conclusions and identifying directions for 
further research. 
2. Theoretical framework 
Our theoretical model is directed at explaining heterogeneity across firms regarding the importance they 
attribute to secrecy as a knowledge protection mechanism. While all firms have strong incentives to 
protect their knowledge from competitors, some find secrecy more useful than others, thus reflecting the 
importance of secrecy for knowledge protection (Conti, 2014). We begin by defining key constructs that 
establish the theoretical mechanisms of knowledge protection by secrecy and that differentiate secrecy 
from other forms of knowledge protection. This provides us with a basis for extending the framework in 
the hypotheses section. 
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Firms can increase their innovation performance if they create innovations that allow them to set 
higher prices based on an at least temporary monopoly position in the product market, or benefit from 
comparatively lower costs due to process innovations. In both cases, the competitive advantage 
disappears once competitors acquire the underlying knowledge of the innovation and imitate products or 
processes (Arrow, 1962). Consequently, sustainable competitive advantage can only be achieved if 
competitors can be prevented from using a firm’s knowledge (Liebeskind, 1996). 
All forms of knowledge protection are centered on the idea of making the imitation of a firm’s 
knowledge as costly and risky as possible (for a review on imitation, see Ordanini, Rubera and DeFillippi, 
2008). In fact, there is considerable evidence that imitation is oftentimes incomplete (Westphal, Seidel 
and Stewart, 2001) or error-prone (Denrell, 2003). Errors in imitation are consequential because of the 
substantial related costs. Indeed, estimates of imitation costs range between 25 percent (Shenkar, 2010) 
and 65 percent of the original innovation expenditures and can take 70 percent of the time to develop 
(Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner, 1981). Among firms’ active strategies to protect their knowledge, 
patenting and secrecy are the dominant forms. While the former has received ample attention in 
management research (e.g., Levitas and McFadyen, 2009; McGahan and Silverman, 2006), the latter has 
been much less explored theoretically. This oversight is surprising because secrecy has been found to be 
among the most important forms of knowledge protection for firms of all sizes and industries (Arundel, 
2001; Harabi, 1995). Our focus is therefore on secrecy. 
Patents require the disclosure of the knowledge associated with the innovation and prevent 
imitation through the threat of punishment in court. The mechanisms underlying secrecy are 
fundamentally different because they try to prevent or at least delay the imitation process by non-
disclosing the underlying knowledge. We define secrecy as all restrictions at the firm level that prevent 
unintended knowledge flows outside of firm boundaries. The essence of secrecy is, therefore, to make the 
imitation search process as costly and unpredictable as possible by preventing any information outflows 
concerning internal knowledge. By making knowledge invisible to outsiders, secrecy makes it difficult for 
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imitators to identify a firm as a promising source for imitation and to access its knowledge once it has 
been identified. The widely used example for the latter is the original Coca-Cola recipe, which has never 
been legally protected, but which has been kept secret (Hannah, 2005). Often, the implementation of 
secrecy also has a legal component (Png, 2017; Castellaneta, Conti, Veloso and Kemeny, 2016). 
However, in contrast to the legal protection by patents that aim at preventing the use of protected 
knowledge but not its diffusion, legal trade secrets have the objective of reducing the risk of 
misappropriation and imitation by limiting information flows (Castellaneta, Conti and Kacperczyk, 2017). 
While knowledge per se has some characteristics of public goods, firms can limit access to where 
it is physically produced and stored, who can access it and whether the authorized personnel can transfer 
it. Secrecy measures are therefore sets of rules that limit the transfer of knowledge to specified others, 
social interactions with them or restrictions on physical access to certain locations, e.g., laboratories 
(Liebeskind, 1996). Employees may be granted access to knowledge only after they have made a 
contractual commitment to knowledge protection, e.g., non-competition clauses for discontinuations of 
labor contracts (Katila et al., 2008). Secrecy is frequently used because of its flexibility compared with 
patenting. It can be applied to all types of knowledge (e.g., non-codified, tacit, early stage) and achieved 
through internal procedures instead of legal procedures, and it does not expire (Encaoua, Guellec and 
Martinez, 2006; Hannah, 2005; Maurer and Zugelder, 2000). In contrast, only 32 percent of all inventions 
are ever patented and patent propensity varies significantly across industries, e.g., 74 percent of all 
innovations are patented in pharmaceuticals (Arundel and Kabla, 1998).  
Despite its broad applicability, the effectiveness of secrecy depends on the nature of the 
knowledge that the firm wants to protect (Bos et al., 2015). Secrecy is particularly effective for protecting 
knowledge that by its nature is easier to keep invisible from potential imitators. Consequently, secrecy is 
especially effective for protecting innovations based on complex or tacit knowledge that is difficult to 
codify and replicate (Amara, Landry and Traoré, 2008), such as process innovations that tend to be 
hidden within the firm (Gonzalez-Alvarez and Nieto-Antolin, 2007), and products with relatively short 
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life cycles (Blind and Thumm, 2004). The effectiveness of secrecy also depends on the innovation 
development phase since it is easier to keep knowledge hidden from potential imitators when an 
innovation is in the premarket development phase (Arundel, 2001; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). 
We build upon these existing findings and delineate the theoretical mechanisms of what makes 
secrecy especially important as a knowledge protection instrument based on information economics and 
signaling theory arguments. The essence of secrecy is the creation or extension of an information 
asymmetry between a firm and potential imitators with regard to the firm’s knowledge stock. The value of 
this knowledge stock represents the economic value of future returns from a firm’s investments in 
knowledge production through R&D. Firms differ regarding how visible their activities are to potential 
imitators. When information about the value of the knowledge stock of a particular firm is limited, 
potential imitators have difficulties distinguishing between valuable inventions to imitate and worthless 
inventions to ignore. In the following, we will theorize on how firm visibility influences the importance 
attributed by firms to secrecy as a knowledge protection instrument. 
3. Hypotheses development 
The primary assumption for our hypotheses is that potential imitators operate under conditions of 
information asymmetry. Consequently, firms are often unable to make fully informed decisions (Stiglitz, 
2002). Many decisions imply the assessment of the capabilities and potential of other firms, and this 
information is often difficult to get (Chaddad and Reuer, 2009). Firm insiders have information about 
firms’ capabilities while outsiders, e.g., investors, customers and competitors, only have partial 
information about the firm (Kirmani and Rao, 2000). Consequently, in order to make a more informed 
evaluation, external parties look for signals that offer indications on the unobserved ability of a firm 
(Connelly, Certo, Ireland and Reutzel, 2011). 
Such signals are also relevant for potential imitators. In fact, imitation can be understood as a 
general search process under conditions of uncertainty (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). Ex ante, the 
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imitating firm cannot know which competing firm, or which part of the competing firm’s knowledge, is 
worth imitating. Similar to traditional search theory, the imitating firm would like to consider all potential 
competitor knowledge, but resources, as well as management attention for searching and screening, are 
limited (Koput, 1997). The imitator, thus, finds itself in a tradeoff between searching too broadly or too 
narrowly. In order to decrease the search and imitation costs, imitators will target their attention toward 
firms whose activities are more visible and consequently easier to evaluate. Important and easily available 
information sources are firms’ own financial reports, where firms disclose their financial situation, 
earnings and costs in order to inform their shareholders or the public. We argue that secrecy is a more 
important knowledge protection instrument for firms that are legally obliged to disclose information, 
because the availability of the disclosed information makes them more visible to potential imitators. 
Financial reporting and disclosure are important means for communicating firm performance to 
stakeholders and outside investors (Healey and Palepu, 2001). Firms provide disclosure through financial 
reports, or voluntary communication, such as analysts’ forecasts, press releases or corporate reports. 
Existing research shows that disclosures are relevant for firms because companies can benefit by reducing 
the costs of capital (Clarke, 1983) or improving liquidity (Diamnond and Varrecchia, 1991). Companies 
differ in the demands for accounting and disclosure (Burgstahler et al., 2006). Specifically, public firms, 
which are financed by external stakeholders, face higher demands for disclosure because investors do not 
have private access to company information and rely on public information, such as financial statements 
to make decisions. The quality of the disclosed information determines investors’ willingness and 
reluctance to invest capital in these firms so that public companies have higher incentives to provide 
information that helps external stakeholders evaluate firms’ decisions and the resulting performance. Due 
to the standardization of accounting requirements, private limited companies are, however, also facing 
requirements to disclose their information publicly. In the European Union, for example, accounting and 
disclosure standards are determined by the legal form of the company so that private and public limited 
firms face the same mandatory disclosure requirements (Burgstahl et al., 2006).  
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The legal requirements to reveal information to shareholders also make general information about 
the firm available to competitors. An important part is financial information, such as equity investments, 
bank loans, asset investments, sales revenues or profitability. Previous research has shown that this 
financial reporting is most likely to contain information that signals the innovation potential to external 
parties (Cohen et al. 2012). Therefore, disclosures can be consequential because they can reveal relevant 
information to potential imitators (Verrecchia, 1983; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Disclosure decisions, thus, 
involve a tradeoff between reducing investor uncertainty regarding a company’s performance on the one 
hand, and revealing important information to competitors on the other (Dedman and Lennox 2009; Li 
2010). Competitors can use disclosed information to their advantage, thus impairing the future 
performance of a disclosing firm. We argue that firms that are legally required to reveal information will 
more actively try to create information asymmetry with potential imitators regarding knowledge that is 
not reported in mandatory statements. In particular, we expect that these firms will try to keep 
information about their innovation activities, such as the development of new prototypes or of new 
manufacturing processes, hidden from potential imitators. Consequently, for these firms that are legally 
required to reveal information, secrecy will be more important as a knowledge protection instrument. We 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Secrecy is more important as a knowledge protection instrument for firms that are 
legally required to disclose information to external parties than for firms that do not have this 
legal requirement. 
While firms that are obligated to disclose information report their overall value periodically to 
shareholders, regulators, tax authorities or the general public per se, the valuation of its knowledge stock 
is not necessarily identical to the outside expectations about its value (Chaddad and Reuer, 2009; Levitas 
and McFadyen, 2009; Ndofor and Levitas, 2004). We expect the effect of visibility associated with 
information disclosure to vary with specific firm characteristics. Specifically, we predict that the effect of 
mandatory disclosure of information on the importance of secrecy will be stronger for firms located in 
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technological clusters, with higher levels of fixed asset investment and that had a higher product 
innovation performance in the past. In the following hypotheses we will discuss how the main mechanism 
described in hypothesis 1 is influenced by these factors. 
We start out by discussing the role of technological clusters. A technological cluster is a regional 
concentration of technological activity in an industry (Alcácer and Zhao, 2012). Firms situated in these 
clusters have access to a pool of knowledge that is generated by a dense network of firms and universities 
(Saxenian, 1996). This common pool of knowledge is created due to three main mechanisms. First, due to 
the fact that knowledge flows are particularly likely to occur between firms that are located in the same 
region (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson, 1993) and that this direct interaction 
between firms stimulates the creation of common knowledge between them (Powell, Koput and Smith-
Doerr, 1996). Second, firms that are located in the same region often rely on common buyers and 
suppliers. This creates an indirect interaction with competitors and, therefore, facilitates the creation of a 
shared pool of tacit and valuable knowledge (Alcácer and Chung, 2007). Finally, the high concentration of 
firms also increases job mobility because individuals tend to move to nearby, existing firms (Almeida and 
Kogut, 1999) or new ventures (Glaeser and Kerr, 2009). Consequently, firms located in clusters are more 
involved in knowledge flows because employees who change jobs act as knowledge transfer agents 
(Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). Taken together, these mechanisms suggest a direct positive effect from 
location in a technological cluster on the importance attributed by firms to secrecy as a way to protect their 
knowledge. We reason that the general effect from location in a technological cluster will reinforce the 
positive effects of legally required information disclosure for a focal firm on the importance of secrecy. 
Technological clusters create a context in which the risks of imitation are comparatively higher for 
all firms since potential imitators within clusters are better prepared to read and interpret quality signals 
(Brown and Duguid, 2001) and have higher levels of mutual absorptive capacity (Tallman, Jenkins, Henry 
and Pinch, 2004). However, potential imitators would still need to identify particular firms, which are the 
most promising targets for imitation within a technological cluster. Especially technologically vibrant 
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clusters such as Silicon Valley have large numbers of startups and laboratories experimenting with broad 
varieties of technologies and functionalities. Given the substantial costs and risks of imitation (Lieberman 
and Asaba, 2006; Ordanini et al., 2008), imitators cannot choose imitation targets randomly. Financial 
information such as equity investments, bank loans, asset investments, sales revenues or profitability of 
innovative firms can provide signals for their innovation potential as well as for its value for potential 
imitators. Firms without legal requirements for information disclosure can keep such financial information 
private. Firms with legal requirements to reveal information, though, face higher risks of imitation since 
their activities are more visible and consequently easier to evaluate by potential imitators. Given that their 
information disclosure is legally mandated and that omissions or misinformation can have substantial legal 
consequences, the disclosed information provides particularly reliable information to potential imitators. 
We reason that this signaling effect is comparatively more consequential within a technological cluster 
since potential imitators are particularly apt in interpreting the signals within a cluster. They develop 
similar knowledge (Powell et al., 1996), can turn to shared buyers or suppliers for information (Alcácer 
and Chung, 2007) or hire key personnel from innovative firms (Almeida and Kogut, 1999). 
Consequently, we expect that firms located in a technological cluster, when compared with their 
counterparts located elsewhere, will face higher risks of imitation and will attribute comparatively more 
importance to secrecy as an instrument to keep knowledge that is not revealed in mandatory disclosure 
agreements invisible to potential imitators. We propose: 
Hypothesis 2: Secrecy is more important as a knowledge protection instrument for firms that are 
legally required to disclose information to external parties than for firms that do not have this 
legal requirement, and this difference is larger for firms located in a technological cluster. 
We discuss investments into fixed assets as a second moderating factor. Complementary asset 
theory links asset investments to the value that firms can capture from innovation (Teece, 1986). 
Complementary assets can be non-fixed (e.g., customer base) or fixed in nature (e.g., manufacturing 
plants, distribution and service networks or sales organizations). We focus on the latter because of their 
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higher visibility. While complementary assets are crucial for capturing value from a technological 
invention, they require financial investments. Resource-constrained firms have been found to even forgo 
the commercialization of technologies because of the investments in complementary assets that they 
would have required (Arora et al., 2001). 
The direction of the main effect of investments in fixed assets on the importance of secrecy for a 
focal firm is not obvious. On the one hand, such investments can send visible signals to potential imitators 
that a firm wants to commercialize a sizable innovation worth imitating. On the other hand, firms 
controlling significant complementary assets such as production facilities could increasingly rely on these 
assets for capturing value from their innovations instead of secrecy. The exploration of this direct effect is 
not central to our study. Instead, we are concerned with how investments into fixed assets moderate the 
effect of legally required information disclosure on the importance of secrecy for knowledge protection. 
Investments in fixed assets are not necessarily sending signals to potential imitators of a focal 
firm’s innovation activities. These investments can be potentially unrelated to innovation or exploiting 
old technologies, e.g., storage facilities. Hence, it is important that imitators can infer specialized 
complementarity (Teece, 2006) between a firm’s fixed asset investments and its innovations. Imitators 
would find it difficult or even impossible to make these assessments systematically for innovative firms 
that do not disclose information to the public. However, firms that are legally required to disclose 
information are much more likely to explain the purpose of their fixed asset investments to particular 
investors or banks, credit rating agencies or analysts in general. Investments into manufacturing plants or 
sales offices are likely to be justified by the anticipated demand for innovative products or services 
(Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). This information is also available to potential imitators and increases the risk 
of imitation. Tesla provides a fitting example for the way in which its prospectus filed with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2010 describes how proceeds will be used for fixed asset 
investments as well as the relationship with its innovative products (excerpt): 
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“We currently anticipate making aggregate capital expenditures of between $100 mil-
lion and $125 million during the year ended December 31, 2010. These capital ex-
penditures will include approximately $42 million to purchase our planned Tesla 
manufacturing facility for the Model S in Fremont, California, excluding any manu-
facturing equipment we may subsequently acquire. Our aggregate capital expendi-
tures will also include funding the expansion of our Tesla stores. We expect to use a 
portion of the net proceeds to fund this expansion, which we estimate will cost approx-
imately $5 million during the year ended December 31, 2010 and an additional $5 
million to $10 million annually over the next several years thereafter to establish ap-
proximately 50 stores globally.” 
In sum, legal requirements for releasing information combined with investments into fixed assets 
by an innovative firm send particularly visible signals to potential imitators. Given these signals, the 
incentives for innovative firms to keep the knowledge underlying their innovations secret increase, and 
we consequently expect that these firms attribute more importance to secrecy. We hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: Secrecy is more important as a knowledge protection instrument for firms that 
are legally required to disclose information to external parties than for firms that do not have 
this legal requirement, and this difference increases with a firm’s investment in fixed assets. 
The uncertainty about a firm’s R&D investments has two main components (Amit, Glosten and 
Muller, 1990). The first one is related to the potential of R&D investments to lead to technologically 
feasible inventions. This technological uncertainty originates from the fact that experiments may fail 
completely or produce outcomes that do not meet expectations and requirements. For example, 
pharmaceutical research relies heavily on combining chemical compounds for producing new drugs 
through experimentation. A vast majority of these experiments do not lead to a successful drug or produce 
a drug without the desired medical effect (Thomke and Kuemmerle, 2002). The second uncertainty 
component is related to the commercial success of inventions. Even if R&D activities lead to the creation 
of a technologically feasible invention, economic success could be disappointing since the invention may 
not meet customer demands or may have lower quality than competing products. Gourville (2006) 
estimates that, depending on the product category, 40 to 90 percent of all innovations fail after they have 
been introduced into the market. Hence, there is a substantial market uncertainty component. 
15 
 
Based on the premise that the best predictor of future performance is past performance, we argue 
that past product innovation success provides a strong signal for the true value of a firm’s knowledge 
stock. Innovation success in terms of realized sales not only implies that the invention is novel and 
technologically feasible but that it also has economic value, as evidenced by the customer’s willingness to 
pay for it. In essence, a track record of successful products gives an indication that both technology and 
market uncertainty inherent in performance firms’ R&D projects are reduced. What is more, potential 
imitators are very likely to operate in similar markets and technology environments (Dussauge, Garrette 
and Mitchell, 2000). Successful innovations in these markets can be expected to be directly relevant and 
observable to them. We argue that successful firms draw the attention of imitators to their knowledge 
stock and face more risks of imitation. Consequently, we expect a direct positive relationship between past 
innovation performance and the importance attributed by firms to secrecy as a knowledge protection 
mechanism. 
In addition to this direct effect, we also anticipate that past innovation success moderates the 
effect of legally required information disclosure on the importance of secrecy for knowledge protection. 
We claim that past innovation performance provides a signal that complements the information revealed 
by firms in their reporting. Financial reporting contains information that signals the innovation potential of 
a firm to external parties (Cohen et al., 2012), and past innovation success strengthens this signal by 
indicating that a firm is able to develop innovation activities that lead to economic returns. We expect that 
firms that provide detailed information about their activities and have a record of success conducting 
innovation activities will be targeted by imitators as valuable sources of knowledge and consequently will 
attribute more importance to secrecy as a knowledge protection mechanism. That is, we argue that the 
general effect from previous success in innovation activities will increase the positive effect of legal 
requirements to disclose information on the importance of secrecy. We hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 4: Secrecy is more important as a knowledge protection instrument for firms that are 
legally required to disclose information to external parties than for firms that do not have this 
legal requirement, and this difference increases with a firm’s past innovation performance. 
4. Empirical study 
4.1. Data and sample 
We use data from the German Innovation Survey “Mannheim Innovation Panel” of 2005, 2011 and 2013. 
The survey is the German contribution to the European Union’s Community Innovation Survey (CIS). 
The CIS survey is directed at decision makers on innovation activities within companies from different 
manufacturing and service sectors, such as CEOs, the heads of R&D or innovation management 
departments. The survey sample is stratified by region (East and West Germany), firm size and industry 
and, therefore, is representative for Germany as a whole. Decision makers on R&D or innovation 
management are asked directly if and how their firms are able to generate innovative products, services 
and/or processes. All core constructs on innovation inputs and outputs follow the OECD standard that is 
outlined in the Oslo manual (OECD, 2005). Moreover, CIS surveys are subject to extensive pre-testing 
and piloting in various countries, industries and firms with regard to interpretability, reliability and 
validity (Laursen and Salter, 2006). This multinational application of CIS surveys adds extra layers of 
quality management. It is therefore not surprising that CIS data have been the basis for several 
publications in highly ranked management journals (e.g., Laursen and Salter, 2006 for the UK; Leiponen 
and Helfat, 2010, 2011 for Finland). 
Survey approaches are well-established in tracing innovation decisions at the firm level (e.g., 
Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010, 2011). We merge the survey data with patent 
statistics from the European Patent Office (EPO) and scientific personnel at the regional level collected 
by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) of the Federal Employment Agency of Germany. We 
obtain data for competitive intensity (concentration) at the industry level from the leading German rating 
17 
 
agency, Creditreform, which is the basis for the Amadeus database of Bureau van Dijk and a frequently 
used database for the population of German firms. Industries are measured using the classification of 
economic activities in the European Community (NACE), while the regions are measured using a 
functional classification of the official regional German statistics (“Raumordnungregionen”). Such 
regions typically consist of an urban center and the districts that surround it. These agglomeration areas 
are not strictly based on administrative borders but rather reflect functional linkages such as commuter 
streams. The final sample is fairly representative of Germany, covering 46 industries at the two-digit 
NACE level and 95 geographical, agglomeration areas (Germany has 97 in total). 
Our dataset originates from 683 firms, which have responded to the survey waves of 2005, 2011 
or 2013. These survey waves ask respondents to assess the importance of secrecy for knowledge 
protection in their company in the preceding three years. Please see details on the time structure of the 
dataset in the next section. Most firms respond only once to the survey, resulting in a total of 812 firm 
observations for all estimations.1 This specific structure of our data does not allow a difference-in-
difference or fixed-effect estimation, but we are able to account for unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity by means of a random intercept. 
4.2 Variables 
4.2.1 Dependent variables 
Our dependent variable measures the relative relevance of secrecy as a knowledge protection instrument 
compared to other knowledge protection instruments. The CIS questionnaire contains questions in which 
respondents assess the effectiveness of different knowledge protection instruments for their innovation 
activities on four-point scales, ranging from 0 = “not important at all” to 3 = “very important.” The 
knowledge protection instruments comprise secrecy, patents, licenses, complexity of product design, lead 
                                                          
1 567 firms respond once, 103 respond twice (of which 76 in consecutive periods) and 13 firms respond three times. 
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time advantages and copyrights. We interviewed a number of managers from various industries about 
secrecy measures for innovation in their firms in order to infer whether their interpretations of secrecy are 
aligned with the theoretical construct. Most interviewees described organization-wide confidentiality 
trainings and agreements, which are combined with targeted measures limiting access to databases, 
prototypes or code. Appendix A provides a representative overview with illustrative quotes from these 
interviews. 
Following Arundel (2001), we derive a measure of the relative importance of secrecy versus the 
other instruments at the firm level by creating the difference between the importance of secrecy and the 
average importance of all other instruments.2 By this, we try to avoid inter-rater differences in the 
interpretation of the importance scales. We also use a different operationalization to test the robustness of 
our effects, where the dependent variable shows the rank of secrecy among all other knowledge protection 
instruments described above, and estimate ordered probit models which are described in the robustness 
check section 5.2. 
The importance of secrecy and all other knowledge protection instruments is part of the CIS 
survey in 2005, 2011 and 2013. Our data consist of observations from all three years. In the survey, 
managers are asked to assess the importance for the three years previous to the survey, i.e., in the survey 
wave of 2013, secrecy is measured for the years 2012, 2011 and 2010. Accordingly, we use the 
independent variables from 2009 for the wave of 2013, from 2007 for the wave of 2011 and 2001 for the 
wave of 2005 to reduce reverse causality concerns3. 
                                                          
2 Arundel (2001) uses a relative measure of the importance of secrecy to patents. The strong focus on patents as a 
reference knowledge protection instrument appears too narrow for our research question and empirical setting. 
3 Our independent variables are lagged by one period with respect to the last period covered by the dependent varia-
ble, i.e., in the case of the survey wave 2013, the independent variables are from year 2009. Consequently, our inde-
pendent variables contain the information from the years 2001, 2007 and 2009. We use year 2001 as a baseline. 
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4.2.2 Independent variables 
To test the hypotheses, we need a variable that differentiates firms according to their legal requirement to 
disclose information publicly to shareholders. In the European Union, the legal requirements for 
information disclosure are determined by the legal form of the company (Burgstahler et al., 2006). The 
German Commercial Code (“Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB”) requires firms to publish at least an annual 
report when they are a corporate, legal entity that applies to companies with limited liability and stock 
companies. Annual reports are the primary source of information and easily available to competitors 
(Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey, 2015). Consequently, we derive the 
variable “legal requirements to disclose information” that is valued 1 in case a company’s legal form 
requires information disclosure. The reference group includes companies that do not have a separate legal 
entity from their owners, i.e., they are private companies or incorporated commercial partnerships. The 
operationalization by a dummy indicating the presence of mandatory information disclosure or not, is in 
line with previous studies that operationalize company reporting behavior (e.g., Garcia-Sanchez and 
Noguera-Gamez, 2017; Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-Ariza and Garcia-Sanchez, 2014). 
We also need information on whether a firm is located in a technological cluster region, on a 
firm’s fixed asset investments and on its past product innovation performance. Technological clusters are 
not easily captured because administrative headquarters do not necessarily identify the location of 
knowledge production (Alcácer and Zhao, 2012). We trace the geographical concentration of knowledge 
production in an industry based on employment statistics. For this, we use official employment statistics 
collected by the Institute of Employment Research (IBA) of the Federal Employment Agency of 
Germany. The data include a 50 percent, stratified sample of all employees in Germany and therefore 
serve as an excellent predictor for the regional distribution of skilled labor (Sofka, Shehu and de Faria, 
2014). More precisely, the data provide information on the concentration of skilled employees (the share 
of engineers and scientists) as measures for technological clusters in a country at a combined industry and 
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regional level. The data are aggregated regionally at the level of agglomeration areas and two-digit NACE 
classification industry levels.  
We use the share of scientists and engineers in the focal firm’s region and industry relative to the 
total number of engineers and scientists working within this industry in Germany. We use this index as a 
determinant of whether this specific region is considered to be a technological cluster for the operating 
industry of a specific firm. This approach does not require the ex-ante definition of technological clusters, 
but provides a continuous measure on how near a specific region is to being a technological cluster for a 
specific industry.  
We measure the level of investment of a firm on fixed assets in thousands of euro and 
logarithmically transformed. Lastly and in line with previous studies (e.g., Laursen and Salter, 2006; 
Nerkar and Roberts, 2004), we measure past product innovation performance with the firm’s sales 
associated with new products. We normalize this variable by dividing it by a firm’s total sales (Table 1). 
4.2.3 Control variables 
We control for several factors that may influence the importance of secrecy as a knowledge protection 
instrument for a firm. First, we add R&D intensity because R&D activities may affect the firm’s need for 
knowledge protection by secrecy. We measure R&D intensity as a share of a firm’s R&D expenditures to 
its total sales (Table 1). Second, we control for non-R&D innovation expenditures to take into account 
that some firms may be closer to commercializing their innovation than others. CIS surveys ask 
respondents to report innovation expenditures that not only include R&D, but also expenditures for the 
acquisition of equipment, licenses, software, market introduction, etc. We subtract firms’ R&D 
expenditures from these total innovation expenditures and normalize the value by sales. Larger values 
indicate that firms are intensively investing in producing and/or selling their innovations. 
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We also control for the patent activities of firms by including the firm’s stock of EPO patents. 
Specifically, we measure the patent stock with the natural logarithm of the number of patent applications. 
Weapply a depreciation yearly rate of 15 percent, which is a widely applied procedure in scientific 
publications (e.g., Aerts and Schmidt, 2008).4 Furthermore, we control for the firms’ degree of 
internationalization through the export share of sales, since the involvement in internationalization may 
trigger firms to more actively protect their knowledge (Golovko and Valentini, 2011). 
Moreover, we control for structural differences among firms. We measure firm size by three 
dummies for small (less than 50 employees), medium (50 to 250 employees) and large firms (more than 
250 employees). Large firms are used as a reference group. We control for whether a firm engages in 
process innovation because potential imitators can also aim at copying newly developed processes. We 
include company age (the natural logarithm of the number of years since founding) to control for potential 
“liability of newness” effects. A firm may also draw from the resources of a company group and benefit 
from knowledge spillovers, internal access to finance or other synergies. Hence, we include a binary 
variable for whether the firm is part of a group and differentiate between international and domestic 
MNCs because international and domestic groups differ with respect to their knowledge protection 
strategies and potentially with respect to the importance of secrecy (e.g., Sofka et al., 2014). 
In addition, we control for effects due to competitive intensity within the focal firm’s industry by 
adding the Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index. Concentration indices are calculated using 
employment figures at a NACE two-digit industry level (indices using sales numbers are highly 
correlated). We also control for the personnel mobility within the industry and region of a firm. If a firm 
operates in an industry and is located in a region with high personnel mobility, secrecy may become more 
important, to avoid tacit knowledge outflows with employees who leave the firm.  
                                                          
4 de Rassenfosse and Jaffe (2017) suggest that the R&D yearly depreciation rate varies in a range of 1 to 5 percent, a 
value considerably lower than our assumed value of 15 percent. As consistency checks, we estimated models where 
the patent stock has a depreciation rate of 3 percent and 5 percent. The results are fully consistent with our findings. 
The results are not presented in the paper but are available upon request. 
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--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Knowledge protection depends on industry characteristics such as the appropriability regime and 
the nature of technological opportunities (Teece, 1986; Grimpe and Sofka, 2009). Cohen et al. (2000) 
related appropriability decisions to the complex or discrete nature of technologies in an industry. 
Following their industry classification, we introduce a dummy variable for manufacturing sectors with 
discrete technologies, e.g., in the production of food, textiles or metals. Additionally, we include industry 
dummy variables according to OECD classifications: medium high-tech manufacturing, high-tech 
manufacturing, distributive services, knowledge-intensive services and technological services. Low-tech 
manufacturing serves as a comparison group. We add two year dummies for years 2007 and 2009 with 
2001 serving as a baseline to capture the remaining time-specific effects such as the overall growth of the 
economy.5 
4.2.4 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our data. On average, the positive relative importance of secrecy 
compared to other knowledge protection instruments indicates its relevance for the average firm in our 
sample. However, we see a high dispersion of the relative importance of secrecy, since the standard 
deviation is 1.03 higher than the mean value. 92 percent of the firms in our sample have legal 
requirements to disclose information. The average firm in our sample invests roughly € 4,600 (maximum 
€ 1m) in fixed assets (in logs of thousands: 0.59) and has a share of past sales due to product innovations 
of 23 percent. Moreover, it spends 5 percent of its sales on R&D, slightly more than the average German 
average, and it is 17 years old. 6 percent of the firms are part of a foreign multinational group, and 11 
                                                          
5 We also estimate a model with an industry classification based on the two-digit NACE codes. The results are in 
line with our main models presented in the paper and are available upon request. 
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percent are part of a domestic group. 42 percent of the firms in our sample are small-sized with less than 
50 employees, and 37 percent are medium-sized with 50 to 250 employees. The major part of the firms in 
our sample operates in medium high-tech industries and technological services. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
An inspection of the correlation matrix (Table 3) does not reveal any multicollinearity issues, 
showing a mean variance inflation factor (VIF) of only 1.66 (maximal VIF value amounts 3.72). In 
addition, we test for common method bias by applying Harman’s one-factor test and find no indication of 
common method bias: a principal component analysis for all of the model variables leads to 11 factors 
with an eigenvalue greater than one, and no factor explains more than 13 percent of the variance 
(Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
4.3 Estimation method 
We estimate linear regression models with the relative importance of secrecy as the dependent variable. 
The focal independent variables are the legal requirements to disclose information as well as its 
interaction effects with the technological cluster, investment in fixed assets and past innovation success. 
Since some of the firms in our sample participated in more than one survey wave, we include a random 
intercept at the firm level to account for unobserved firm heterogeneity that is not captured by our control 
variables. In addition, we estimate clustered standard errors at the firm level to account for the 
autocorrelation between the error terms of the corresponding observations of a firm.   
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We estimate four model specifications: Model 1 represents a baseline model without interaction 
effects. In Model 2, we add the interaction between the mandatory information disclosure and the 
technological cluster. In Model 3, we add the interaction with investment in fixed assets, and Model 4 
includes the interaction with past product innovation performance. Hypothesis 1 is tested by the 
coefficient for the main effect of the mandatory information disclosure dummy in Model 1. Hypotheses 2-
4 are tested by the respective coefficient of the interaction effects in Models 2-4. In Model 5 we include 
all interaction effects simultaneously to show the robustness of our effects 
5 Results 
5.1  Main results 
Table 4 shows the results for all of the model specifications. In line with hypothesis 1, the effect of the 
legal requirements to disclose information on the relative importance of secrecy is positive and significant 
(b=.21, se=12, p=.09). Thus, we conclude that the results support hypothesis 1, where we predict that 
secrecy becomes more important for companies that need to publicly disclose information to 
shareholders. The effect is sizable given that the average value for the relative importance of secrecy is 
0.51. In other words, the relative importance of secrecy is roughly 40 percent higher for firms with 
mandatory information disclosure requirements. While this relative measure cannot simply be translated 
into economic impact, it is likely to interfere with important strategic decisions such as “make or buy” 
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006) or strategic alliance decisions (Katila et al., 2008), which have been 
found to be directly influenced by firm secrecy. 
Model 2 shows a significant positive interaction effect of the legal requirements to disclose 
information variable with location in technological clusters (b=3.20, se=1.23, p<.01). This result supports 
hypothesis 2, where we postulate that companies that are required to disclose their information publicly 
attribute more importance to secrecy if they are located within a technological cluster (see Figure 1). 
Interestingly, the direct effect of the technological cluster location on the relative importance of secrecy is 
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negative (b=-2.45, se=1.08, p<.05; Table 4). The reason for this may be that companies that are located 
within geographical clusters need to signal willingness to share information and openness to potential 
collaborators, making secrecy less important compared to other knowledge protection instruments.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Model 3 includes the interaction effect with a firm’s investment in fixed assets. The interaction 
effect is, as expected, positive and significant (b=.36, se=.12, p<.01), thus providing support to hypothesis 
3. This shows that for firms that have a legal requirement to disclose information and high investment 
levels in fixed assets, secrecy becomes more important than for their counterparts with lower levels of 
investments in fixed assets (see also Figure 2). Interestingly, the direct effect of investment in fixed asset 
on secrecy is negative (b=-.31, se=.12, p<.001). We can only speculate that these fixed assets can provide 
complementary assets for the average firm, which would require comparatively less secrecy for 
appropriating the returns from an innovation. Finally, Model 4 includes the interaction with the past 
product innovation performance. The interaction is not significant, so we do not find support for 
hypothesis 4. Model 5 includes all three interaction effects simultaneously. All interactions remain stable 
in terms of size and significance.  
The significant effects of the control variables are in line with the expectations, and they remain 
stable across the different model specifications. We find significant effects for the variables measuring 
R&D intensity and process innovation. In addition, firms operating in discrete manufacturing technology, 
medium high-tech, high-tech industries and technological services assign a higher relative importance to 
secrecy as a knowledge protection instrument. Lastly, we see temporal effects for the year 2007. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
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5.2 Consistency and sensitivity checks 
To test the robustness of our results, we apply multiple consistency tests. All robustness estimation results 
are available upon request from the authors if not directly referenced below. First, we use a different 
operationalization of the industry classification, and rely on industry dummies based on two-digit NACE 
codes, instead of the OECD dummies used in the main model. All effects remain robust. Second, we test 
whether the rate of IPR objections in an industry affects our results and show that, while secrecy becomes 
more important for companies operating in industries with a high number of patent objections, it does not 
affect any of our hypothesized results. 
Third, we test the robustness of our results toward the different depreciation rates of the patent 
stock. We run models with patent stock based on depreciation rates between 1 and 20 percent but do not 
see any effect. Fourth, to show the rationale behind our hypotheses, we test whether the same mechanism 
we delineate for the importance of secrecy also applies to other knowledge protection instruments, which 
may be similar in nature, such as complex product design or lead time. We run the same model 
specifications as in Table 4, but with the relative importance of complex product design and lead time, 
instead of secrecy. While we find a positive direct effect of mandatory disclosure requirements on the 
importance of complex design, no effect emerges for lead time, and none of the interaction effects are 
significant. This finding indicates that our theoretical mechanisms cannot be simply extended to all other 
knowledge protection instruments. Fifth, we check the robustness of the results towards an alternative 
operationalization of firm size. We use dummy variables for size classes in the main estimation models 
because the variable for investments into fixed assets is significantly correlated with a continuous 
measure of firm size. Using size dummies may limit the models’ ability to capture unobserved factors that 
are correlated with size. Hence, we run additional models with the continuous measure of firm size 
replacing size dummies in order to test if the hypothesized interaction effect with investments in fixed 
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assets remains stable. The results are consistent with the findings reported in Table 4 and give us 
confidence that the results support our theoretical reasoning. Lastly, we test a model specification with a 
different operationalization of our dependent variable. Specifically, we measure the rank of the 
importance of secrecy compared to the importance of all other knowledge protection instruments (patents, 
licenses, complexity of product design, lead time advantages, and copyrights). We rank all instruments 
based on their stated importance and use the rank of secrecy for each firm as our dependent variable. We 
use the same independent variable specifications as in Models 1-5 of Table 4, and estimate ordered probit 
models. The results in Table 5 show that all our focal effects have the same direction and significance as 
in our main models. Overall, these results underline the robustness and consistency of our estimated 
effects in the main models. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------- 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
6.1 General discussion 
In this study, we predict the importance of secrecy for protecting a firm’s knowledge based on its 
visibility to potential imitators. We show that legal requirements to disclose information to the public 
make secrecy measures for knowledge protection increasingly crucial. Moreover, we find evidence that 
knowledge protection through secrecy is even more important for firms with legal requirements to 
disclose information when they have higher fixed assets and are located in technological clusters. 
Our findings have important implications for two primary streams of research. First, we go 
beyond existing literature on knowledge protection and appropriability, which has described the 
importance of secrecy as based largely on knowledge characteristics, industry factors and cost 
considerations (James et al., 2013; Bos et al., 2015). Instead, we provide a theoretical model that links the 
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importance of secrecy to the visibility of firms, thereby emphasizing that its importance is (a) firm-
specific and (b) can change with increasing visibility. Secrecy rests on the prevention of information 
flows, which makes mechanisms from information economics and signaling theory particularly relevant. 
Future studies may build on our approach and theorize on dynamic, firm-specific vulnerabilities of firms 
from imitation, thus affecting other knowledge protection instruments such as lead time. 
Second, we extend existing research treating the importance attributed to secrecy by a firm as 
mainly dependent on its industry (Katila et al., 2008). Our findings indicate that more comprehensive 
approaches to modeling the relationship between knowledge protection and firm performance should 
model the importance of secrecy endogenously based on firm-specific vulnerabilities originating from 
signals to imitators. Such models could eradicate potential sources of bias.  
Finally, our findings have immediate consequences for the technology management in firms. Our 
findings indicate that managers should shift attention to secrecy measures such as restricted access to 
laboratories or databases when the focal firm has to release information publicly and thereby becomes 
visible to competitors. Investments in such secrecy measures are most pressing when the focal firm is 
located in a technological cluster and makes investments into fixed assets. 
6.2 Future Research 
Our study provides new insights into the relationship between firm visibility and knowledge protection 
strategies at the firm level. First, we focus our attention on one knowledge protection instrument, secrecy, 
since its effectiveness depends on the creation of information asymmetry between firm insiders and 
outsiders. However, firms could dynamically adjust their knowledge protection strategies. The particular 
circumstances under which firms make these changes deserve more attention. In addition, we focus on 
mandatory information disclosures, which are regulated legally. Companies may decide to provide 
additional information on a voluntary basis for different strategic reasons. Future studies could investigate 
whether these voluntary information disclosures affect knowledge protection beyond what we show in 
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this study for mandatory information disclosure. While our study allows us to distinguish information 
disclosure requirements for a representative sample of firms, we cannot distinguish the level and quality 
of information that these firms eventually disclose. 
Second, our theoretical reasoning rests on a model of information asymmetry between innovative 
firms and imitators. These mechanisms may apply to varying degrees to different knowledge protection 
instruments, e.g., lead time or complex design. Future studies may be able to develop dedicated 
theoretical models for these knowledge protection instruments. Third, due to the specific structure of our 
data, we are unable to make causal statements on the relationships that we investigate. Future studies 
could use field experimental data, or longer panel data with more observations per firm to better model 
these structural relationships. Fourth, we describe how the importance of secrecy is affected by firms’ 
legal requirements to disclose information. Future studies can extend our model both theoretically as well 
as empirically and link these changes to innovation performance. Fifth, our data does not allow for a 
differentiation between the different types of fixed asset investment made by firms. A future study 
differentiating between R&D and non-R&D fixed assets investment would complement our findings. 
A complementary study could focus on how differences in the visibility of innovation related 
knowledge affect the importance attributed by firms to secrecy. It would be interesting to better 
distinguish firms that do not attribute importance to secrecy because their knowledge would become 
inevitably visible from firms that attribute less value to secrecy for strategic reasons. Also, potential 
imitators differ in their abilities to read signals and to imitate (Zhao, 2006). A dyadic perspective would 
consider this factor, but the data requirements would be high. Finally, we believe future studies could use 
more extensive data to better understand and model the two-stage decision process according to which a 
firm first decides whether to undertake deliberate knowledge protection in a first step and then decides to 
use secrecy in a second step.   
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TABLES 
Table 1: Operationalization of variables 
Variable Description 
Secrecy Relative importance of secrecy compared to other knowledge protection instruments 
Mandatory information disclosure Firm has legal requirements to disclose information (1=”yes”/0=”no”) 
Share of scientists/engineers to industry and region 
Share of engineers and scientists working in a company to total number  
working in industry and region (%) 
Investment in fixed assets Total investment expenditures for fixed assets 
Small firm size Firms with up to 50 employees (1=”yes”/0=”no”) 
Medium firm size Firm with 50 to 250 employees (1=”yes”/0=”no”) 
Large firm size  Firms with more than 250 employees (1=”yes”/0=”no”, baseline) 
Past innovation performance Share of sales with firm novelties to total sales (%) 
R&D intensity Share of R&D expenditures to total sales (%) 
Non-R&D innovation expenditures    
Total innovation expenditures (including expenditures for equipment,  
market introduction, licenses, etc.) excluding R&D as a share of total sales (%) 
Patent stock Number of patent applications 
Export intensity  Share of exports to total sales (%) 
Process innovation 1=”yes”/0=”no process innovation” 
Company age Number of years since founding 
Foreign MNC Firm is part of a foreign multinational group (1=”yes”/0=”no”)  
Domestic MNC Firm is part of a domestic multinational group (1=”yes”/0=”no”)  
HHI  
Herfindahl concentration index calculated using employee data of firms  
in an industry (two-digit level) 
Share of job switchers to industry and region 
Share of employees switching employers of total number employees 
 working in an industry and region (%) 
Discrete manufacturing tech. Dummy variable following industry classification of Cohen et al. (2000) 
Medium high-tech manufacturing 1=”yes”/0=”no”  
High-tech manufacturing 1=”yes”/0=”no”  
Distributive services 1=”yes”/0=”no”  
Knowledge-intensive services 1=”yes”/0=”no”  
Technological services 1=”yes”/0=”no”  
Observation year 2007 1=”yes”/0=”no”  
Observation year 2009 1=”yes”/0=”no”  
Observation year 2011 1=”yes”/0=”no” (reference year) 
Low-tech manufacturing 1=”yes”/0=”no” (reference industry) 
*: these variables are transformed as natural logarithms in the model 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
      Secrecy 812 0.51 1.03 -2.00 3.00 
Mandatory information disclosure 812 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Share of scientists/engineers to industry and region 812 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.81 
Investment in fixed assets 812 0.59 0.90 0.00 6.91 
Company age 812 2.82 0.94 -4.61 4.61 
Small companies 812 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Medium companies 812 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Past innovation performance 812 0.23 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Foreign MNC 812 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Domestic MNC 812 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
R&D intensity 812 0.05 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Non-R&D innovation expenditures (ratio) 812 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.80 
Patent stock 812 -3.03 2.56 -4.61 6.24 
Export intensity 812 0.22 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Process innovation 812 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
HHI 812 5.84 17.93 0.11 379.14 
Share of job switchers in industry and region 812 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.87 
Discrete manufacturing tech. 812 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Medium high-tech manufacturing 812 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
High-tech manufacturing 812 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Distributive services 812 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Knowledge-intensive services 812 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Technological services 812 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Observation year 2007 812 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Observation year 2009 812 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Observation year 2001 812 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Low-tech manufacturing 812 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Large companies 812 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
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Table 3: Correlation table 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1 Secrecy 1 
                       
2 MDI 0.08 1.00 
                      
3 Share of scientists/engineers  0.00 -0.03 1.00 
                     
4 Investment in fixed assets 0.01 0.05 0.01 1.00 
                    
5 Company age -0.07 -0.05 0.03 0.12 1.00 
                   
6 Small companies -0.01 -0.13 -0.06 -0.45 -0.15 1.00 
                  
7 Medium companies 0.00 0.09 0.05 -0.08 0.03 -0.64 1.00 
                 
8 Past innovation performance 0.13 0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.14 0.05 0.06 1.00 
                
9 Foreign MNC -0.02 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.00 -0.20 0.09 -0.03 1.00 
               
10 Domestic MNC 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.20 0.12 -0.28 0.05 -0.07 -0.09 1.00 
              
11 R&D intensity 0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 0.16 -0.07 0.26 -0.04 -0.09 1.00 
             
12 Non-R&D innovation  0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 0.16 -0.06 0.21 0.01 -0.09 0.17 1.00 
            
13 Patent stock 0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.42 0.12 -0.31 -0.03 0.07 0.14 0.31 0.18 -0.01 1.00 
           
14 Export intensity 0.08 0.15 -0.05 0.22 0.11 -0.26 0.05 0.02 0.17 0.27 -0.02 -0.04 0.49 1.00 
          
15 Process innovation 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.15 0.02 -0.11 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.12 0.03 1.00 
         
16 HHI -0.03 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 
        
17 Share of job switchers  -0.07 -0.09 0.10 -0.09 -0.05 0.13 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.12 -0.05 0.00 -0.22 -0.28 -0.01 0.01 1.00 
       
18 Discrete manufacturing tech. 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.14 0.11 0.07 -0.14 -0.10 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.09 -0.22 1.00 
      
19 Medium high-tech  0.09 0.09 -0.10 0.15 0.10 -0.18 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.21 -0.06 -0.03 0.28 0.36 0.00 0.02 -0.30 -0.11 1.00 
     
20 High-tech manufacturing 0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.09 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.00 -0.07 0.10 -0.03 0.08 0.11 -0.03 0.01 -0.13 -0.13 -0.19 1.00 
    
21 Distributive services -0.13 -0.07 0.07 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.11 0.02 -0.18 -0.20 -0.03 0.03 0.19 -0.24 -0.17 -0.12 1.00 
   
22 Knowledge-int. services -0.02 -0.08 0.10 -0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.13 -0.18 0.05 0.03 0.38 -0.16 -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 1.00 
  
23 Technological services 0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.17 -0.18 0.25 -0.11 0.14 -0.07 -0.13 0.33 0.23 -0.11 -0.20 -0.03 -0.07 0.34 -0.32 -0.23 -0.16 -0.14 -0.10 1.00 
 
24 Observation year 2007 0.18 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.17 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 1.00 
25 Observation year 2009 -0.15 -0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.11 0.04 0.00 -0.15 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.08 0.08 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.59 
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Table 4: Estimation results 
                                           Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
b (se)   b (se)   b (se)   b (se)   b (se) 
 
Mandatory information disclosure (MDI)        0.21 * 0.09 
 
0.04 
 
0.22 
 
-0.11 
 
                                           (0.12) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.17) 
 
MDI*Technological cluster             
 
3.20 ***             
 
            
 
3.70 *** 
                                                       
 
(1.23) 
 
            
 
            
 
(1.27) 
 
MDI*Fixed assets             
 
            
 
0.36 ***             
 
0.38 *** 
                                                       
 
            
 
(0.12) 
 
            
 
(0.12) 
 
MDI*Past innovation performance             
 
            
 
            
 
-0.03 
 
0.04 
 
                                                       
 
            
 
            
 
(0.62) 
 
(0.59) 
 
Technological cluster location 0.47 
 
-2.45 ** 0.44 
 
0.47 
 
-2.95 *** 
                                           (0.59) 
 
(1.08) 
 
(0.60) 
 
(0.59) 
 
(1.13) 
 
Investment in fixed assets        0.03 
 
0.03 
 
-0.31 *** 0.03 
 
-0.33 *** 
                                           (0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.12) 
 
Past innovation performance 0.38 ** 0.38 ** 0.39 ** 0.41 
 
0.35 
 
                                           (0.17) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.62) 
 
(0.58) 
 
Company age       -0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
                                           (0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
Small firm size                         -0.01 
 
0.00 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
                                           (0.13) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.14) 
 
Medium firm size  0.00 
 
0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
                                           (0.12) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.12) 
 
Foreign MNC     -0.22 
 
-0.22 
 
-0.23 
 
-0.22 
 
-0.23 
 
                                           (0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
Domestic MNC       -0.05 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.06 
 
                                           (0.13) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.13) 
 
R&D intensity 0.56 * 0.54 * 0.58 * 0.55 * 0.56 * 
                                           (0.30) 
 
(0.30) 
 
(0.30) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.31) 
 
Non-R&D innovation expenditures 0.12 
 
0.10 
 
0.23 
 
0.12 
 
0.20 
 
                                           (0.37) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.38) 
 
Patent stock -0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
                                           (0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
Share exports to sales 0.21 
 
0.21 
 
0.22 
 
0.21 
 
0.22 
 
                                           (0.17) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.17) 
 
Process innovation                   0.13 * 0.13 * 0.11 
 
0.13 * 0.12 
 
                                           (0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
HHI 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
                                           (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
Share of job switchers in industry and region 0.00 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.02 
 
0.00 
 
-0.12 
 
                                           (0.51) 
 
(0.51) 
 
(0.51) 
 
(0.51) 
 
(0.51) 
 
Discrete manufacturing technology 0.27 ** 0.27 ** 0.27 ** 0.27 ** 0.27 ** 
                                           (0.11) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.11) 
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                                           Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
b (se)   b (se)   b (se)   b (se)   b (se) 
 
Medium high-tech manufacturing 0.34 *** 0.35 *** 0.34 *** 0.34 *** 0.35 *** 
                                           (0.12) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.11) 
 
High-tech manufacturing   0.20 
 
0.21 
 
0.21 
 
0.20 
 
0.21 
 
                                           (0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
Distributive services     -0.09 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.08 
 
                                           (0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
Knowledge-intens. services             0.23 
 
0.30 
 
0.23 
 
0.23 
 
0.31 
 
                                           (0.21) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.21) 
 
Technological services        0.26 * 0.27 * 0.27 * 0.26 * 0.28 * 
                                           (0.16) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.16) 
 
Observation year 2007                      0.27 *** 0.27 *** 0.26 *** 0.27 *** 0.27 *** 
                                           (0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
Observation year 2009                      -0.13 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.13 
 
                                           (0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
Constant                                   -0.16 
 
-0.05 
 
0.00 
 
-0.16 
 
0.14 
 
                                           (0.27) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.29) 
 
Overall R2                                 0.09 
 
0.09 
 
0.10 
 
0.09 
 
0.10 
 
Wald Chi2                                  105.83 
 
114.91 
 
111.82 
 
106.07 
 
122.68 
 
p-value                                    0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 ***: p<.01, **: p<.05, *: p<.10 
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Table 5: Results of ordered probit model with alternative measure of the secrecy importance 
                                           Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
b (se)   b (se)   b (se)   b (se)   b (se) 
 
Mandatory information disclosure (MDI)           0.36 * 0.05 
 
0.20 
 
0.46 
 
-0.11 
 
                                           (0.22) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.37) 
 
MDI*Technological cluster             
 
11.08 *             
 
            
 
11.25 ** 
                                                       
 
(5.78) 
 
            
 
            
 
(5.56) 
 
MDI*Fixed assets             
 
            
 
0.38 *             
 
0.43 ** 
                                                       
 
            
 
(0.19) 
 
            
 
(0.19) 
 
MDI*Past innovation performance             
 
            
 
            
 
-0.42 
 
-0.17 
 
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
(0.95) 
 
(0.95) 
 
Technological cluster location 0.35 
 
-10.39 * 0.32 
 
0.36 
 
-10.56 * 
                                           (0.82) 
 
(5.71) 
 
(0.82) 
 
(0.82) 
 
(5.48) 
 
Investment in fixed assets        0.08 
 
0.08 
 
-0.28 
 
0.08 
 
-0.33 * 
                                           (0.09) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.19) 
 
Past innovation performance 0.42 * 0.41 * 0.43 * 0.81 
 
0.57 
 
                                           (0.23) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.94) 
 
(0.95) 
 
Company age       -0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.03 
 
                                           (0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 
Small firm (<50)                           0.08 
 
0.09 
 
0.06 
 
0.08 
 
0.07 
 
                                           (0.18) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.19) 
 
Medium sized firm (>=50, <250)             0.10 
 
0.09 
 
0.09 
 
0.09 
 
0.08 
 
                                           (0.16) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.16) 
 
Foreign MNC     -0.37 * -0.37 * -0.38 * -0.37 * -0.38 * 
                                           (0.22) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.22) 
 
Domestic MNC       -0.06 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.06 
 
                                           (0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
R&D intensity 0.61 
 
0.58 
 
0.62 * 0.57 
 
0.58 
 
                                           (0.37) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.38) 
 
Non-R&D innovation expenditures 0.00 
 
-0.03 
 
0.08 
 
0.02 
 
0.07 
 
                                           (0.54) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(0.54) 
 
Patent stock 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
                                           (0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
Share exports to sales 0.44 ** 0.44 ** 0.44 ** 0.44 ** 0.44 ** 
                                           (0.22) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.22) 
 
Process innovation                   0.19 * 0.20 ** 0.18 * 0.19 * 0.18 * 
                                           (0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
HHI -0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 * 
                                           (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
Share of job switchers in industry and region 0.56 
 
0.43 
 
0.54 
 
0.55 
 
0.40 
 
                                           (0.82) 
 
(0.83) 
 
(0.82) 
 
(0.82) 
 
(0.83) 
 
Discrete manufacturing technology 0.26 * 0.27 * 0.26 * 0.26 * 0.27 * 
                                           (0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
Medium high-tech manufacturing              0.32 ** 0.32 ** 0.32 ** 0.32 ** 0.32 ** 
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                                           Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
b (se)   b (se)   b (se)   b (se)   b (se) 
 
                                           (0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
High-tech manufacturing   0.34 * 0.34 * 0.34 * 0.34 * 0.35 * 
                                           (0.18) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.18) 
 
Distributive services     -0.73 *** -0.72 *** -0.73 *** -0.73 *** -0.72 *** 
                                           (0.27) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.27) 
 
Knowledge-intens. services             -0.17 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.06 
 
                                           (0.35) 
 
(0.36) 
 
(0.35) 
 
(0.35) 
 
(0.36) 
 
Technological services        0.20 
 
0.21 
 
0.21 
 
0.21 
 
0.22 
 
                                           (0.21) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.21) 
 
Observation year 2007                      0.51 *** 0.52 *** 0.51 *** 0.52 *** 0.51 *** 
                                           (0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
Observation year 2009                      0.37 ** 0.36 ** 0.37 ** 0.37 ** 0.36 ** 
                                           (0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
Constant           
                                   (0.24) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.23) 
 
R2                                         812.00 
 
812.00 
 
812.00 
 
812.00 
 
812.00 
 
N                                          61.68 
 
61.82 
 
63.66 
 
62.04 
 
65.24 
 ***: p<.01, **: p<.05, *: p<.10 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Interaction effect between the variables mandatory information disclosure (MDI) and technolog-
ical cluster 
 
Note: “no cluster” represents a share of engineers and scientists relative to region and industry  which is 
lower than the sample mean by one standard deviation; “cluster” represents a share of engineers and scien-
tists relative to region and industry which is higher than the sample mean by one standard deviation. 
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Figure 2: Interaction effect between the variables mandatory information disclosure (MDI) and investment 
in fixed assets 
 
Note: “low” represents firms with a lower level of investment in fixed assets than the sample mean by one 
standard deviation; “high” represents firms with a higher level of investment in fixed assets than the sam-
ple mean by one standard deviation.   
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Appendix A: Example quotes for secrecy measures from expert interviews 
Position of inter-
viewee 
Industry Description of secrecy measures 
Project manager 
  
Manufacturer of chemi-
cal products 
For our company, protection of internal information plays a central role for product and process innovation 
and for acquisitions. To protect our knowledge and ensure secrecy, we thus have multiple processes. For ex-
ample, our company has specific nondisclosure and secrecy agreements that must be signed in order to re-
ceive access to selected IT systems or buildings. Also, we have research agreements with third-party collabo-
rators, which include separate secrecy agreements, partly with significant financial penalties. We also offer 
regular trainings on information protection to our employees, who then must pass a test.  
Strategy consultant IT company Much like any other technology company, we have numerous policies in place to ensure the protection of the 
company’s intellectual property and confidential information, particularly regarding new product develop-
ment but also in respect to our business operations in general. Employees are trained regularly regarding ad-
herence to these policies. More general examples include predefined confidentiality levels for certain types of 
information and required authorization for disseminating information. Product development specific exam-
ples are non-disclosure agreements for co-innovations or the testing of prototypes with end-users. 
Chief data scientist IT company with focus 
on artificial intelligence 
and predictive analytics 
In order to assure that we can protect our relevant intellectual property and data, we put the following pro-
cesses in motion: 
- Every employee is contractually obliged to transfer all IP rights of his or her work immediately to the 
company; 
- Every employee is sworn in to data privacy; 
- We do not make the source code of our software publicly accessible; 
- We do not use printouts, USB sticks or any other removable media for sensible information 
- We use two-factor authentication as the only means of access to our source code and production data; 
- Production data are never stored on any mobile devices like PCs or phones, only on the central serv-
er; 
- Source code is only stored on the central server and on encrypted devices that are password-
protected; and 
- External collaborations are accompanied by a mutual NDA agreement that ensures that all exchanged 
information stays confident. These NDA agreements ensure that all exchanged information, code, 
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concepts etc. must stay privileged unless they are already common facts. 
Sales director Leisure services As a distributive service company we do not develop proprietary products. However, protection of sensitive 
(e.g., customer) data, as well as process innovations is very relevant for us. For this, we have very strict regu-
lations on how to access and handle sensitive data. Every employee has to sign nondisclosure agreements, 
and is trained before gaining access to the IT system. Also, external collaborations are always accompanied 
by a mutual NDA agreement that encompasses all exchanged sensitive information. In some cases, external 
collaborators have to sign a competition clause, which forbids them from transferring processes specific to 
our company to other customers.  
Director strategy Advertising agency For our industry, protection of information is essential. For this, we have very strict regulations. Every em-
ployee is sworn to data privacy. Employees are not allowed to have printouts of any customer presentation, or 
other sensitive information in their working stations. All employees have to sign contracts with specific regu-
lations on data protection and secrecy, partly with financial penalties. Employees in central positions have to 
sign competition clauses that prohibit them from switching to our direct competitors after they leave the com-
pany. In the case of advertising campaigns for innovative products that are not yet introduced into the market, 
employees have to work in offices without windows, or with covered windows in order to minimize the risk 
that the product design, e.g., of new cars, is revealed before its market introduction. 
